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A Committee or a Conference?1 
JAROSLAV VALKOUN
In the last decades of the 19th century, some of the overseas territories 
connected to Britain had accomplished considerable political, economic 
and social development. As their importance rose, even their ambitions for 
greater autonomy grew bigger: in their view, the autonomy should consist 
of constitutional change in relations with the mother country and of greater 
involvement in imperial foreign policies. This process was due to the weakness 
of the system of imperial conferences as an institution: none of its resolutions 
could be enforced, as the Conference did not dispose of any legislative or 
executive powers. At the same time, the system was negatively affected by the 
complex international situation and issues linked to the joint imperial defence.2 
Moreover, the last three Colonial and Imperial Conferences meant only bitter 
disappointment to their “reformers”: New Zealand’s Prime Ministers Richard 
Seddon (1902) and Sir Joseph Ward (1911) and their Australian counterpart 
Alfred Deakin (1907).3 Despite all its shortcomings the system of Imperial 
Conferences contributed to institutional and constitutional development of 
the Empire and was also instrumental in the Empire’s transformation into the 
British Commonwealth.4
In the period leading to the First World War, three main basic subject 
areas on defence matters were affecting the relations between Dominions and 
1  This article has been published as a part of the research project of the Grant Agency of Charles 
University (GAUK) No. 609812 under the title “Postoje Velké Británie a jejích dominií ke 
konstitucionálním otázkám v rámci Britského impéria v letech 1917–1931 [The Attitudes 
of Great Britain and its Dominions to Constitutional Issues within the British Empire in the 
Years 1917–1931]” as tackled at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague.
2  I. R. HANCOCK, The 1911 Imperial Conference, in: Historical Studies: Australia and New 
Zealand, Vol. 12, Is. 47, 1966, p. 357. 
3  J. W. DAFOE, Laurier: A Study in Canadian Politics, Toronto 1922, pp. 57–58.
4  Cf. A. G. DEWEY, The Dominion and Diplomacy: The Canadian Contribution, Vol. 1, 
London 1929, p. 147.
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the mother country. In the first place, it was important to find an answer to 
the question whether in case of war the Dominions were to secure their own 
defence first and help Britain only afterwards, or first help the mother country 
and thus prevent its potential defeat, which could lead to their standing alone 
in the conflict. The second issue concerned the imperial defence, in which the 
Dominions’ nationalism clashed both with the isolationism of the non-English 
speaking populations in Canada and South Africa and with the requirements of 
the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial Defence. The third complication 
was caused by disparity between the British defence commitments and Great 
Britain’s actual resources.5
In the last years of peace, the international situation was changing 
abruptly, one crisis lead to another; however, due to the rigid attitude of the 
British Liberal Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith the British Empire’s 
institutional machinery was not able to react adequately. Frequent critical 
comments of opponents of the imperial conferences saying that between 
two regular sessions the system was undesirably inactive, started to 
grow in intensity after the “achievements” of the 1911 conference.6 As 
the Conference participants could not reach an agreement on proceeding 
with some necessary reforms, several issues of foreign and defence policy 
remained unsolved.7 However, it became generally acknowledged that 
the arrears of defence and foreign affairs should be automatically handed 
over to the Committee of Imperial Defence, which was to find an adequate 
solution. Moreover, some governmental officials started to openly give 
priority to the Committee over the Conference system. The Committee 
was taken for a more flexible body, as it was able to meet more often than 
the Conferences; at the same time it was directly influenced by the British 
5  D. C. WATT, Imperial Defence Policy and Imperial Foreign Policy, 1911–1939 – A Neglected 
Paradox?, in: Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 1, Is. 1, 1963, p. 267.
6  Cf. H. D. HALL, Commonwealth: A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
London 1971, p. 103; W. K. HANCOCK, Australia, London 1966, p. 221.
7  H. H. ASQUITH, The Genesis of the War, London 1923, pp. 120–121.
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Prime Minister, which could lead to undue pressure on its members’ 
decision-making.8
In the years 1911–1914, the imperial defence was under the authority 
under two bodies: the Imperial General Staff and the Committee of Imperial 
Defence. Both authorities had advisory roles and their meetings were open to 
representatives of the Dominions, although the Committee’s member structure 
was not fixed. 9 The 1911 discussions on foreign policy at the Committee of 
Imperial Defence had great impact on the Dominions’ autonomy. The co-
operation on the imperial foreign policy issues, however, was not as effective 
as in defence matters.10
In 1911, the powerful Round Table Movement’s plans failed, when 
they did not succeed in pushing through Ward’s proposals.11 Despite that, the 
Movement did not get embittered and did not abruptly stop their efforts in 
the Empire’s reorganization. They also intensified their efforts to strengthen 
the common defence and foreign policies, as the movement felt threatened 
by the growing power of Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany.12 It was not only Lionel 
Curtis, Leopold Amery and other members of the Round Table Movement, but 
also Dominions’ politicians who realized the importance of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, and they therefore strove to make it develop into a full scope 
imperial institution.13 Similarly as in 1907, it was the position of Canada which 
seemed to be crucial. Lionel Curtis therefore focused on the new Canadian 
Conservative Prime Minister, Sir Robert Laird Borden, who had taken his 
8  J. E. KENDLE, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887–1911: A Study in Imperial 
Organizations, London 1967, pp. 185–186.
9  G. P. de T. GLAZEBROOK, A History of Canadian External Relations, London 1959, p. 
273.
10  R. JEBB, The Britannic Question: A Survey of Alternatives, London 1913, pp. 43–45; 
DEWEY, pp. 294–295.
11  To the problems cf. VALKOUN, The Attempts to Reform the System of Imperial Conferences 
in the Years 1907–1911, in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, No. 1, 
2013, pp. 144–157.
12  J. E. KENDLE, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, Toronto 1975, p. 114.
13  KENDLE, The Colonial, p. 198.
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office in October 1911. Sir Robert’s vision when entering the office was that 
as a front executive representative he should: 1) give honest and true speeches, 
2) be dignified, honourable and determined, 3) keep a clear and sharp mind, 
sympathy towards peaceful Britons, friendship towards Americans and 4) 
never forget he was a Canadian.14 Unlike his predecessor Wilfrid Laurier, 
Borden didn’t hold isolationist views and he founded his attitudes in relation 
to the mother country on three basic interconnected factors: 1) Canadian 
autonomy, 2) a greater degree of responsibility, and 3) greater involvement in 
imperial foreign policy decision-making.15
In December 1911, Curtis sent Borden a copy of his “Green 
Memorandum”, asking him to read it soon; he believed that the future 
wellbeing of the Empire depended on Canadian steps. In March 1912, he 
even approached Borden with an appeal to prefer the Committee over the 
Imperial Conference system as the continual communication channel among 
overseas governments and the British cabinet.16 Curtis was also endorsed by 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, who raised an appeal on 
March 20, 1912, in the House of Commons that the Committee should be 
granted a more important status in the relations between Dominions and the 
mother country, before the position of the Self-governing Colonies could be 
settled once for all.17 Curtis planned to use Borden’s visit in London, where the 
Canadian Prime Minister was going to discuss the naval and defence issues 
with his British counterpart, the Admiralty and the Foreign Office;18 during 
14  W. L. COURTNEY – J. E. COURTNEY, Pillars of the Empire: Studies & Impressions, 
London [1918], p. 92.
15  BORDEN, R. L., Splendid Record of the Borden Government Naval Policy Clearly 
Defined, Ottawa 1913, pp. 18–23; F. H. SOWARD, Sir Robert Borden and Canada’s External 
Policy, 1911–1920, in: Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association/
Rapports annuels de la Société historique du Canada, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1941, pp. 65–82.
16  KENDLE, The Colonial, pp. 199–200.
17  United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates (further only PD), House of Commons (further 
only HoC), 5th Series, Vol. 35, 20th March, 1912, c. 1946.
18  Borden’s discussions in detail cf. R. L. BORDEN, Bill relatif aux forces navales de l’empire: 
discours prononcé par le Très Hon. R.L. Borden, le 5 décembre 1912, [Ottawa 1912]; Canada 
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his several meetings he had arranged with the members of the Round Table 
Movement, he was supposed to convince him to prefer the Committee over 
the Imperial Conferences.19 Borden travelled to England knowing that he was 
having a proverbial ace in his hand: the Canadian contribution to the imperial 
naval defence.20
Although the Round Table Movement was considerably active 
throughout 1912, not all of its members approved of the activities. For instance, 
the Toronto section of the Round Table Movement did not share Curtis’s 
enthusiasm, as they believed it was useless to push forward something that 
was going to solve itself in the foreseeable future anyway.21 Leopold Amery, 
on the other hand, held the view that instead of broadening the authority and 
functions of the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Round Table Movement 
should rather focus on closing the discussions on the reorganization of the 
British Colonial Office at the next Imperial Conference planned for 1915. 
Amery in particular promoted the shift of the Dominion agenda from the 
existing department into a newly created British Imperial Office; after that, the 
Colonial Office would only manage the affairs of the Crown Colonies. Local 
Ministries for Colonial Affairs were to be set in Dominions, which would deal 
with the defence and foreign policies in co-operation with the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and the Foreign Office.22 Amery’s plans were in the long 
and the Navy: Reasons by the Rt Hon. R. L. Borden, M.P., in Favour of a Canadian Naval 
Service and Against a Contribution, Ottawa 1913; G. N. TUCKER, The Naval Policy of 
Sir Robert Borden, 1912–14, in: The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1947, pp. 
1–30; D. C. GORDON, The Admiralty and Dominion Navies, 1902–1914, in: The Journal of 
Modern History, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1961, pp. 414–417; W. C. B. TUNSTALL, Imperial Defence, 
1897–1914, in: The Cambridge History of the British Empire: The Empire-Commonwealth 
1870–1919, Vol. 3, Cambridge 1967, pp. 596–597.
19  KENDLE, The Colonial, p. 201.
20  R. C. BROWN – R. COOK, Canada 1896–1921: A Nation Transformed, Toronto 1974, p. 
205.
21  J. EAYRS, The Round Table Movement in Canada, 1909–1920, in: The Canadian Historical 
Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1957, p. 7.
22  Amery’s attitudes in detail University of Cambridge: Churchill College: Churchill Archives 
Centre (further only CAC), Amery Papers (further only AP), AMEL 1/2/20, Some Suggestions 
on Imperial Policy, November 1912, ff. [1]–14.
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run based on the fact that the basic prerequisite of an imperial union was the 
adoption of the equality principle in the relations between Dominions and the 
mother country.23
In the summer of 1912, during his stay in England, Borden met 
several times with influential figures under the auspices of the Round Table 
Movement, which gradually acquired the position of an informal group 
of experts on imperial matters; the meetings, however, did not inspire any 
noticeable activity, in which Curtis had considerably hoped.24 The British 
government and even the Prime Minister were all the more influenced by 
the new Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Maurice Hankey, 
who had continually promoted the idea of an imperial defence co-operation 
through the Committee.25 Hankey’s imperial vision was founded on creating 
a “quasi-federal organisation with common economy, common defence and 
common foreign policies”.26 In late July 1912, Asquith outlined in which way 
dominions should have a say in the foreign policy. During a discussion on the 
Committee of Imperial Defence in the House of Commons, he allowed that 
in consequence to the growing involvement of the Dominions in the Empire’s 
commitments, it was Britain’s duty to take their views more into account; 
according to him, the Committee could become the appropriate “mediator” in 
the exchange. Asquith also saw the Committee as an “invaluable complement 
to constitutional ties” with Dominions.27
In September 1912, the Round Table Movement published the Canada 
and the Navy article in their Round Table periodical and thus launched their 
23  CAC, AP, AMEL 1/2/18, Parliamentary Empire Tour: Meeting of the Imperial Mission 
Held at the Connaught Rooms, Great Queen St., London, 2nd February, 1914, f. 5.
24  In England, the Canadian Prime Minister met for instance Viscount Alfred Milner, Lionel 
Curtis, Sir James Meston and Viscount Waldorf Astor and his spouse. KENDLE, The Colonial, 
p. 201.
25  Cf. The National Archives, London, Kew (further only TNA), Cabinet Papers (further only 
CAB) 17/101, Hankey to Harcourt, 3rd July, 1912, ff. [1–4]; TNA, CAB 17/101, Hankey to 
Grey, 29th July, 1912, ff. [5–7].
26  WATT, p. 268.
27  PD, HoC, 5th Series, Vol. 41, 22nd July, 1912, c. 872; ibidem, 25th July 1912, cc. 1386–1387.
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public campaign for replacing the Conference system with the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, which they considered a “germ” of a Cabinet of the Empire. 
The anonymous author of the article highlighted the importance of Canada 
and the Commonwealth of Australia and invited them to get more thoroughly 
involved in forming the imperial foreign policy.28 There also appeared a view 
that although the Committee had already taken an important position in the 
imperial structure, it could still become only a provisory, not permanent 
forum, for as an advisory body it was not representative and independent 
enough for the representatives of Dominions, as it was indirectly influenced 
by the British Foreign Office.29 At the end of September 1912, Richard Jebb, 
a well-known supporter of the Conference system and of colonial nationalism, 
joined the discussion. Jebb firmly rejected visions that the Committee of 
Imperial Defence would replace the Conference sessions. He also stressed 
the fact that Imperial Conferences were based on the principle of equality, 
whilst the substance of the Committee consisted of British predominance 
over autonomous parts of the Empire. The fact that unlike the Conference, the 
Committee was summoned based on a decision of the British Prime Minister, 
was in his eyes a symbol of London government’s dominance.30
The subsequent discussion in the autumn of 1912 on the pages of The 
Times made clear some minor doubts ensuing from the relationship between 
the Committee of Imperial Defence and the system of Imperial Conferences. In 
November, upon Asquith’s approval, Hankey was working on an assignment 
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Lewis Vernon Harcourt, 1st Viscount 
Harcourt, drawing a memorandum on the future activities and position of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. On November 25, 1912, Hankey presented 
the memorandum to the cabinet and suggested the Committee should be 
extended by another two sub-committees which would comply with the calls 
28  Cf. Canada and the Navy, in: The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 2, Is. 8, 1913, pp. 634–637; KENDLE, The Colonial, p. 205.
29  H. D’EGVILLE, Imperial Defence and Closer Union, London 1913, p. 210.
30  KENDLE, The Colonial, pp. 207–209.
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of Dominions for more frequent and more factual discussions on defence and 
foreign issues.31 Before the British government took a final decision on Hankey’s 
memorandum, Borden gave a speech on December 5, 1912, at a debate on 
Canadian naval policy in the Canadian House of Commons, in which he 
made scathing comments on how during his London talks he had received 
a promise of unprecedented importance from the British representatives to get 
the advisory vote in the decision-making on imperial foreign policy issues. 
Borden also stressed the important fact that the Committee would not adopt 
any important decision without a representative of Canada having a say in it.32
The London government used Borden’s public statement and sent out 
a telegram to other overseas autonomous governments on December 10, 1912, 
offering them a possibility to take part in the decision-making of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence on the same level as the Canadians. Harcourt suggested 
that from now on a Minister from each Dominion could take part in the talks, 
assuming the position of a regular (permanent) member of the Committee. 
Compared to previous practice, the co-responsibility level of Dominions 
in the decision-making on imperial matters was increased; the Dominion 
representatives were not in the role of mere technical advisors any longer. 
The British Secretary of State for Colonies also stressed that the Committee 
remained a wholly advisory body which would under no circumstance become 
a decisive political authority; this prerogative was reserved exclusively for 
the British government. During the Committee discussions, the Dominion 
representatives had free access to the British Prime Minister as well as the 
Colonial and Foreign Secretaries when a need for complex information on any 
issue of imperial policy presented itself.33
31  Cf. CAC, Hankey Papers (further only HP), HNKY, 7/8, Future Work of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, 22nd November, 1911, f. [1]–11; TNA, CAB 17/101, Hankey to Harcourt, 
Representation of the Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence, 5th November, 1912, 
f. [11].
32  Canada, PD, HoC, 5th December, 1912, pp. 676–693, in: R. M. DAWSON (Ed.), The 
Development of Dominion Status, 1900–1936, London 1965, pp. 161–165.
33  Cf. The Secretary of State [Harcourt] to the Governor-General of Australia, the Governor-
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Harcourt’s telegram was received favourably by the members of the 
Round Table Movement,34 none of the four Dominion governments to whom it 
was addressed, however, shared that enthusiasm. The South Africans doubted 
the practicality of the idea, if the control over foreign policy were to remain 
the prerogative of the British cabinet. The Australian Prime Minister, Andrew 
Fisher, preferred to meet with higher frequency within the system of Imperial 
Conferences to a permanent membership in the Committee of Imperial 
Defence. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, William Massey, also expressed 
a certain “aversion” to the permanent representation at the Committee, which 
was unsuitable for him just regarded the long distance his country, and the 
representatives of Newfoundland answered on a similar tone. The refusing 
attitude of the others was disappointing for Hankey and the Round Table 
Movement; it was a final confirmation that the Committee was not going to 
become an advisory body of the Empire any time soon. Newfoundland, New 
Zealand and the Union of South Africa had accepted the fact that it was the 
mother country who took decisions on foreign policy, Canada and Australia 
went on aspiring on greater influence on imperial policy and only differed 
in the manner of achieving the goal. Borden preferred the Committee to the 
Imperial Conferences, whilst Fisher had adopted the opposite attitude.35
The Dominions’ lukewarm attitude toward the Committee was also 
evident in the fact that until the outbreak of the First World War, they seldom 
attended its sessions36. It wasn’t until June 1914 that Borden sent Sir George 
General of the Union of South Africa, and the Governors of New Zealand and Newfoundland, 
Downing Street, 10th December, 1912, in: Cd. 6560, Dominions No. 13: Despatch from the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies As to the Representation of the Self-governing Dominions 
on the Committee of Imperial Defence, London 1913, No. 1, pp. 2–3; Cd. 6863, Dominions 
No. 14: Report for 1912–13 Relating to the Self-governing Dominions: Prepared in the 
Dominions Department of the Colonial Office, London 1913, pp. 9–10.
34  Policy and Sea Power, in: The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 3, Is. 10, 1913, pp. 197–231.
35  KENDLE, The Colonial, pp. 213–214.
36  It was for instance the case for Sir James Allen (New Zealand), Sir Edward Morris 
(Newfoundland) and others. M. P. A. HANKEY, Diplomacy by Conference: Studies in Public 
Affairs, 1920–1946, London 1946, p. 90.
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Perley as a Minister without portfolio and a High Commissioner to London in 
order to represent Canada as a permanent and regular member at the Committee 
talks. The Dominions, however, did not ignore the defence affairs and went 
on using their own defence committees as a “channel of communication” for 
their dealings with the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose nature and 
importance was to change substantially after the outbreak of the First World 
War.37
In the years 1912–1914, no significant debates38 arose on the 
transformation of the Conference system. Only in December 1912, the 
Australian Governor-General, 3rd Baron Denman, made a request for a partial 
imperial conference to take place in January or February 1913 in Australia. 
Denman founded his wish on a surprising argument that for Australian 
ministers it was inconvenient to have to travel overseas in 1913. Harcourt 
was initially surprised by the date of the suggested meeting, but afterwards 
he rejected Denman’s request, for most of the other Dominion representatives 
were not available at the beginning of 1913 for a visit in Australia. Instead, he 
offered a personal consultation in London in case there were urgent matters to 
discuss.39 
Before 1914, the system of Imperial Conferences had evolved into an 
institution with clear composition, regular meetings and routine procedures. In 
the years 1887–1911, all Conferences had served to a large extent as opinion 
fighting arena, where supporters of federalism encountered its opponents.40 It 
37  Cf. F. A. JOHNSON, Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence 
1885–1959, London 1960, p. 124; A. B. KEITH, War Government of the British Dominions, 
Oxford 1921, p. 17.
38  Constitutional discussions between Richard Jebb and Leopold Amery were going on, 
whether it was more appropriate to use the term “Alliance” or “Union”. CAC, AP, AMEL 
1/2/18, Alliance or Union, January/February 1914, ff. [1]–16.
39  Cf. The Governor-General [Denman] to the Secretary of State [Harcourt], 19th December, 
1912, in: Cd. 7347, Dominions No. 15: Correspondence Relating to the Representation of the 
Self-governing Dominions on the Committee of Imperial Defence, London 1914, No. 2, p. 6; 
The Secretary of State [Harcourt] to the Governor-General [Denman], 10th January, 1913, in: 
ibidem, No. 5, p. 7.
40  W. C. B. TUNSTALL, The Development of the Imperial Conference, 1887–1914, in: The 
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was also quite common that the participation of Dominion Prime Ministers 
at the Conference meetings and their attitudes there weakened their position 
on their domestic political scenes to such an extent that it sometimes led to 
their political fall. Moreover, upon a change in a Prime Minister’s Office, the 
continuity of supported issues was broken and therefore everything had to 
start from scratch. British Colonial Office still contained the Secretariat of the 
Imperial Conference, although its independence was never pushed through. 
The official way of communication still remained as outdated as before, i. e. 
using cablegrams and telegrams from the British Secretary of State for Colonies 
to the Governors or Governors-General and the British Prime Minister; the 
same system worked both ways. If Dominions wanted to communicate with 
a third country, they had to use this clumsy mechanism based on a system of 
British mediators, which was lengthy and inefficient and led to a whole range 
of bizarre misunderstandings. This system was inevitably a drawback at the 
moment the war broke out and when the speed of information exchange meant 
a strategic edge. A change only came after the implementation of the principle 
of permanent cabinet consultations in 1917.41
Abstract
This contribution is focused on the analysis of position of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and the system of Imperial Conferences in inter-imperial 
relations in the years 1911–1914. After the Imperial Conference of 1911 
rejected the reform proposals, some members of the Round Table Movement 
and British and Dominion representatives started the campaign for replacing 
the Conference system with the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Dominion 
refusing attitude was a final confirmation that the Committee was not going 
to become an advisory body of the British Empire any time soon, and that the 
Conference system remained unreformed.
Cambridge History of the British Empire: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870–1919, Vol. 3, 
Cambridge 1967, p. 436.
41  HALL, pp. 103–105.
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